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I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 23, 2011, Mark Byron took to his Facebook page to vent about his 
frustrations with his ongoing divorce and child visitation court battle.
1
  In his post, Byron 
included the following, “…if you are an evil, vindictive woman who wants to ruin your 
husband’s life and take your son’s father away from him completely – all you need to do is say 
that you’re scared of your husband or domestic partner…”2  Byron’s wife, although blocked 
from his Facebook page, eventually learned about the post and brought it to the court’s 
attention.
3
  Byron’s wife used the post as evidence that Byron had violated an existing protective 
order that prevented Byron from doing anything to cause his wife “to suffer physical and/or 
mental abuse, harassment, annoyance or bodily injury.” 4  The presiding Magistrate found Byron 
in contempt of the protective order and gave Byron a choice between posting an apology on his 
Facebook page for thirty (30) consecutive days or going to jail for sixty (60) days, Byron chose 
the former.
5
  Byron’s case is an example of how family law judges are reacting to the increased 
use of social media related evidence by litigants.  Unfortunately, family law courts have 
                                                          
1
 Byron v. Byron, No. DR1101368 (C.P. Jan. 26, 2012) available at 
http://news.cincinnati.com/assets/AB185467221.PDF; KIMBALL PERRY, CINCINNATI.COM JUDGE: JAIL 
OR FACEBOOK APOLOGY, (2012), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20120222/NEWS/302220184.  
2
 PERRY, supra note 1 at 1. 
3
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4
 Id.  
5
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struggled to find a way to properly address issues related to the increased use of social media. 
This is evident by the ever more inconsistent basis with which judges are handling social media-
related evidence.   
Our First Amendment right is a feature that distinguishes us from other free nations 
where freedom of speech and expression has been curtailed in one way or another in effort to 
protect certain groups.
6
  However, our First Amendment protections are not without limitations.
7
  
With the growing popularity of social media websites like Facebook, and blogging platforms like 
Tumblr and Twitter, the issue of how to balance free speech/expression rights with the court’s 
interest in maintaining privacy and legal order has arisen.   This issue has not yet been addressed 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
This paper explores the issue of whether family law judges are vested with the authority 
and discretion to curtail or prohibit a litigants’ freedom of speech and expression via social 
media in efforts to protect children, privacy
8
 and maintain legal order. Part II of this paper 
discusses the emergence of social media services and their increased popularity as outlets for 
communication and expression. This part will also include some examples of how judges are 
using social media in their practice.  Part III will highlight several family law cases that have 
addressed litigants’ use of social media while under the jurisdiction of the court.  These cases 
show the implication that judge-made rules on social media have litigants’ First Amendment 
                                                          
6
 Jonathan Turly, Op-Ed., Shut up and play nice: How the Western world is limiting free speech, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2012, at 1, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-
12/opinions/35499274_1_free-speech-defeat-jihad-muslim-man (For example, Denmark, France, Britain, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland and Russia have restrictions on anti-religious expression.  Also, countries like 
Canada and France ban hateful and discriminatory speech.  
7
 Timothy L. Allsup, United States v. Cassidy: The Federal Interstate Stalking Statute And 
Freedom Of Speech, 13 N.C. J.L & Tech. On. 227, 238 (2012). 
8
 Although it is acknowledge that privacy is an important issue implicated by the increased use of 
Social Media, this paper will not address the Fourth Amendment right to privacy or any other subsidiary 
issues. 
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rights.   Part IV will look at how courts have addressed the intersection of social media and First 
Amendment rights within the context of education, employment and criminal law.  Lastly, in 
Part V this paper will propose a test for family law judges to use in balancing litigants’ freedom 
of speech and expression via social media with the court’s interest in protecting maintaining 
legal order. 
II. THE SOCIAL MEDIA PHENOMENON AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LAW 
Social media is defined as  “forms of electronic communication through which users 
create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as 
videos).”9 Through social media platforms, users are able to create an internet identity, 
update/change content, freely express opinion, interact with other users in the community, and 
exchange information in a way unparalleled to any other form of communication.
10
  In order to 
truly understand the impact that social media has had on our society, it is important to understand 
how fast-paced the progression and growth of social networking has been over the last eleven 
(11) years.
11
    
The social media revolution is said to have started with the birth of Friendster in 2002.
12
  
Friendster is considered the "grandaddy" of social networks.
13
 The service allowed users to 
contact other members, maintain those contacts, and share online content and media with those 
                                                          
9
 M-W.COM, SOCIAL MEDIA, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last 
visited May 5, 2013). 
10
 Hannah Rogers Metcalfe, Libel in the Blogosphere and Social Media: Thoughts on Reaching 
Adolescence, 5 Charleston L. Rev. 481, 492 (2010-2011). 
11
 STEVEN J. VENEZIA, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR JOURNAL, THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL 
MEDIA AND THE LAW AND HOW TO SURVIVE THE SOCIAL MEDIA REVOLUTION, 24 (2012), 
http://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/BJ-Winter2012-Vol52-No4-Pg24.pdf;  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friendster. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Ling Woo Liu, Friendster Moves to Asia, TIME, Jan. 29, 2008, at 1 available at 
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1707760,00.html; Wikipedia, Friendster, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friendster (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
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contacts.
14
 The website was also used for dating and discovering new events, bands, and 
hobbies.
15
  It is said that this website pioneered the connection of “friends.”16 Friendster’s user 
base grew to over 3 million in the first three months.
17
  
 Following the growth of Friendster, in August 2003, several eUniverse employees with 
Friendster accounts decided to create a new social networking site that mimicked the more 
popular features of the website but added a music and gamming component to create MySpace.
18
 
MySpace’s popularity was short-lived, and in 2004, the social networking giant Facebook was 
launched.
19
  The website's membership was initially limited by the founders to Harvard students, 
but was subsequently expanded to other colleges and high school students.
20
  Today, Facebook 
allows any person at least 13 years old to become a registered user of the site.
21
 As of September 
2012, Facebook had over one billion active users, more than half of whom access Facebook on 
their personal mobile device.
22
   
In 2005, YouTube arrived on the social media scene promoting itself as a “video-sharing” 
website.  Like its other social media predecessors YouTube also allows its members to create 
                                                          
14
 Id.  
15
 Id.  
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 Id. 
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 See VENEZIA, supra note 11.  
18
 Felix Gillette, The Rise and Inglorious Fall of Myspace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jun. 27, 
2011, at 1, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_27/b4235053917570.htm. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 25, 2008, at 1, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia. 
21
 Facebook, Information for Parents and Educators, https://www.facebook.com/help/parents (last 
viewed Apr. 2, 2013).   
22
 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Tops Billion-User Mark, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 4, 
2012, at 1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443635404578036164027386112.html.  
5 
 
unique profiles. However, YouTube is most known for its video sharing capabilities. YouTube is 
recognized as the third most popular website in the world.
23
   
Newer additions to the social media phenomenon include microblogging platforms, most 
notably Twitter and Tumblr.  Twitter and Tumblr are considered hybrid social 
networking/microblogging services.  Twitter enables its users to send and read text-based 
messages of up to 140 characters, known as "tweets".
24
  As of 2012, Twitter had over 500 
million registered users. Alternatively, Tumbler, allows users to post multimedia and other 
content to a short-form blog. Users can follow other users' blogs, as well as make their blogs 
private.
25
 As of October 13, 2012, Tumblr had over 77 million blogs.
26
 Tumblr scored 13.4 
million unique visitors in the United States alone in July 2011—up 218% from July 2010.27   
The social media revolution has transcended generations; people from all walks of life 
have taken to the web and adapted to this alternative forum of communication.  In 2011, it was 
estimated that approximately eighty percent (80%) of adults in the United States who had 
computers used social media and most reported spending a majority of their computer time on 
social media websites, like Facebook.
28
 Recent statistics show that “the average Facebook user 
creates ninety pieces of content each month, and there are more than 30 billion pieces of content, 
                                                          
23
 Reuters, YouTube Serves Up 100 Million Videos a Day Online, USA TODAY, Jul. 16, 2006, at 
1, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-16-youtube-views_x.htm.  
24
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twitter. 
25
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tumblr. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. 
28
 Dolly Hernandez, ABA Webinar, The Impact of Social Media on a Divorce Case: Big Brother 
is Watching (2011).  
6 
 
including blog posts, photos, and news stores shared each month.”29   It is reported that Twitter 
generates over 340 million tweets a day and handles over 1.6 billion search queries per day.
30
   
Society has taken to social media as our new favorite medium of communicating with the 
outside world.  These online platforms provide the instant gratification of being able to speak 
your mind with the ease of a few key strokes and a click.   However, there are drawbacks to this 
form of communication. A user of social media runs the risk of having his or her online activities 
used against him or her in court. Consequently, this increased use of social media has had an 
impact on many areas of the law.
31
  For example, Facebook status updates and photos can reveal 
anything from a person’s location, physical condition, stated of mind, and even aid in identifying 
potential witnesses.
32
  And, although social media-related evidence is subject to formal discovery 
requirements
33
; the ease of access of this type of evidence has made it a favorite among attorneys 
and pro se litigants in divorce and child custody proceedings.
34
  Unfortunately, our courts have 
struggled to find a way to properly address issues related to society’s increased use of social 
media. 
In her 2009 article, Social Networks Help Judges Do Their Duty, Miriam Rozen provides 
examples of how judges are using litigants’ social media posts in their practice.35  Among the 
judges highlighted is Judge Kathryn Lanan, who presides over the detention and adjudication 
                                                          
29
 Jeff Bullas, 50 Fascinating Facebook Facts And Figures, 
http://www.jeffbullas.com/2011/04/28/50-fascinating-facebook-facts-and-figures/ (last visited Apr 2, 
2013).  
30
 Id. 
31
 See VENEZIA, supra note 11. 
32
 Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May Transform 
Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 81 (2012).  
33
 See VENEZIA, supra note 11. 
34
 See Burk Robertson supra note 32 (“…Facebook and other social-media sites may offer 
substantial evidence gathering capabilities to individual litigants, both through formal and information 
discovery mechanisms.”). 
35
 Miriam Rozen, Social Networks Help Judges Do Their Duty, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS, Aug. 
25, 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202433293771. 
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hearings at the Gavelston Juvenile Justice Center in Texas.  Judge Lanan has taken an 
unconventional way of tracking the juveniles under her court’s jurisdiction,36  she requires that 
the juveniles “friend” her on their respective Facebook or MySpace pages so that she can keep 
track of all the content on their pages (pictures, posts, likes, etc.).
37
  According to Rozem’s 
article, over the past two years, Judge Lanan has tied her juvenile offenders’ social networking to 
the terms of their probation by limiting the types of Social Media posts they are allowed to make 
to those she classifies as “age appropriate”.38  Judge Lanan shared that some defense lawyers 
have objected to her monitoring the juvenile’s social media pages as a violation of their client’s 
First Amendment rights. Judge Lanan defends her unconventional monitoring by stating that it is 
her way of guarding her probationer’s privacy.39  
A second example provided by Rozen is that of family law Judge Orlinda Naranjo of 
Travis County, Texas.  Judge Naranjo states that she has seen first-hand the impact that social 
media has had over the family law cases she presides.
40
 According to Judge Naranjo, the number 
of attorneys introducing social media-related evidence has increased in recent years.
41
  Naranjo 
acknowledged that when litigants produce this type of evidence, she does look at the content of 
the social media posts when making a determination, especially in child-custody related 
matters.
42
 
                                                          
36
 Id at 3.  
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. (“If a juvenile probationer posts content that involves sex, drugs or gangs, for example, she 
requires them to return to her court for a compliance hearing.  She tells the juvenile that they must remove 
the offensive material or stay in detention until it is removed…”). 
39
 See Rozen supra note 35 (“Lanan believes that monitoring the sites reduced the chances that 
the juveniles will post comments or photos they will regret as adults.). 
40
 Id. at 4. 
41
 Id. (“In 2006, Texas became one of the first states in the nation to adopt rules governing the 
admission of evidence in civil proceedings obtained from social networking sites and individual 
pages…”).  
42
 Id.  
8 
 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON FAMILY LAW PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGANTS’ FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS  
 
The protections afforded by the First Amendment give us the right to post on social 
media, but the law has been unhurried to afford protections once those posts have been made. 
The reality is that even today, most users of social media never contemplate having their online 
activities used against them in a court of law and yet it is happening ever more.  In the family 
law context, social media-related evidence has become commonplace however judges have been 
provided little guidance on how to appropriately respond to this type of evidence.  The cases that 
follow demonstrate the impact that social media has had in family law proceedings by focusing 
on how judges respond to litigants’ social media activities and the implications on the litigants’ 
First Amendment rights. 
a. Social Media Evidence in Family Law 
The 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“the Federal 
Rules”) made it possible for litigants to request production of electronically stored information 
(“ESI”) that can include any content stored in social media.43   Currently, 42 states have adopted 
e-Discovery rules similar to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules.
44
 The impact of social 
media has been particularly great in divorce cases where social media related evidence has 
become the standard.
45
  According to a 2010 survey by the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers, “an overwhelming 81% of the nation’s top divorce attorneys say they have seen an 
                                                          
43
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 26(a)(1), 33, and 34; See VENEZIA, supra note 11 at 25. 
44
 K&L Gates, Current Listing of States that Have Enacted E-Discovery Rules, 
http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/promo/state-district-court-rules/ (last visited May 4, 2013). 
45
 See VENEZIA, supra note 11 at 27; (The results of an American Bar Association poll showed 
that Facebook was the website most cited for those introducing social media-related evidence in family 
law proceedings.)  
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increase in the number of cases using social networking evidence during the past five years…” it 
is probably safe assume the that number has gone up since then.
 46
  Moreover, with sixty-six 
present (66%) of attorneys citing it as the primary source for social media-related evidence, 
Facebook has become a ‘go to’ source in divorce proceedings.47   
Examples abound of ways in which attorneys are effectively using social media-related 
evidence to obtain favorable outcomes in their family law cases.  For example, in a recent 
custody dispute a father was able to use Facebook evidence to show the negative impact that his 
wife’s online gaming habits had on his children.48  Specifically, the father was able to use 
evidence from Facebook to show that the mother was playing Farmville during days and time 
when their children were recorded as being late for school.  The father was granted physical 
custody of the children.
49
     
As states continue adopt and reformat e-discovery rules to meet litigants’ needs, other 
subsidiary issues arise.  For example, in Gallion v. Gallion, Connecticut Judge Kenneth Shluger 
ordered divorcing couple, Stephan and Courtney Gallion to swap their Facebook and dating 
website login names and passwords so that their respective attorneys can search for evidence of 
cheating.
50
  Judge Shluger’s order carries huge implications for the Gallions and other couples 
similarly situated.  First, Judge Shluger’s order is in direct violation of Facebook’s “Terms of 
                                                          
46
 American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Nation's Top Divorce Lawyers Note Dramatic 
Rise In Electronic Evidence, http://www.aaml.org/about-the-academy/press/press-releases/e-
discovery/nations-top-divorce-lawyers-note-dramatic-rise-el (last visited on May 4, 2013).   
47
 Id.   
48
 Michael Bowman, Social Media Wins — and Loses — Family Law Cases, 
JDSUPRALAWNEWS, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/social-media-wins-and-loses-
family-l-48947/.  
49
 Id. 
50
 Gallion v. Gallion, No. FA114116955S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2517 at *1(Conn. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 30, 2011); Kashmir Hill, Judge Orders Divorcing Couple to Swap Facebook and Dating Site 
Passwords, FORBES, Nov. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/11/07/judge-orders-
divorcing-couple-to-swap-facebook-and-dating-site-passwords/. 
10 
 
Service”, which prohibits the sharing of passwords.51 Next, the order represents an invasion of 
privacy by granting opposing counsel unfettered access to the litigants’ cyber identity that goes 
beyond allowing discovery of ESI. Most importantly, the order implicates litigant’s First 
Amendment rights.  Specifically, the order has a chilling effect on the litigants’ freedom of 
expression, by inadvertently signaling to them that their online speech will be more highly 
scrutinized and ultimately afforded less protection.  Judge’s Shluger’s order seems to go beyond 
the scope of e-discovery into dangerous and unchartered waters.  
    
b. Content-Based Restrictions on Litigants’ Social Media Posts 
The Supreme Court has declared numerous times that the United States Constitution does 
not prohibit nor condemn otherwise protected speech just because it may be offensive in 
nature.
52
  On the contrary, the Court has stated that “the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 
"avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes."
53
  Thus, any 
content-based restriction on speech is presumed invalid unless, it can satisfy the requirements of 
a strict scrutiny standard.
54
  In order to overcome strict scrutiny, the governmental action, law, or 
regulation must “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest”, and 
“there must not be a less restrictive alternative” that would serve said purpose.55 The Court has 
carved out a few narrowly-defined categories of speech that fall outside First Amendment 
                                                          
51
 Facebook, Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms 
(last visited on Apr. 2, 2013). 
52
 See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975). 
53
 Erznoznik 422 U.S. at 210-211; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). 
54
 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, 
its subject matter, or its content.”) 
55
 Id. 
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protection, which includes:  true threats,
56
 obscenity,
57
 defamation,
58
 fraud,
59
 incitement,
60
 and 
speech integral to criminal conduct.
61
   The Court’s commitment to limiting the categories of 
speech that fall outside First Amendment’s protection is reflective of the value Americans place 
on their freedom of speech and how much they are willing to tolerate in its defense.
62
     
In Morelli v. Morelli case, Anthony Morelli created a blog, “ThePsychoExWife” to vent 
about his bitter divorce and custody battle against his wife, Allison Morelli.
63
 However, 
Pennsylvania Judge Diane E. Gibbons ordered Morelli to take down the site and forbade him 
from making any further comments about his ex-wife on any form of public media.
64
 Judge 
Gibbons has stated that her decision was based on a balancing of Morelli’s First Amendment 
rights against his children’s best interest.65 This case exemplifies a conflict between the family 
judges’ use of the best interest of the child standard and a content-based restriction on Morelli’s 
speech.   
Based on the facts provided, it is doubtful that Judge Gibbons’ restriction on Morelli’s 
speech would satisfy the strict scrutiny standard for a content-based restriction on speech.  
Family law judges, like Judge Gibbons, have used the wide range of discretion that the best 
interest of the child standard grants them to impose restrictions on the Parent’s First Amendment 
                                                          
56
 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
57
 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 485 (1957). 
58
 See Beauharnais v. Ill., 343 U.S. 250, 261 (1952). 
59
 See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976). 
60
 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
61
 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); Allsup, supra note 7 at 
239. 
62
 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
63
 Morelli v. Morelli, No. A06-04-60750-C, (C.P. Aug. 30, 2011) available at 
http://www.savethepsychoexwife.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/083011-Gibbons-Opinion-
Appeal.pdf. 
64
 Lylah M. Alphonse, Bashing Your Ex In Public May Be Free Speech, But Is It In Your 
Children’s Best Interest?, YAHOO, Aug. 9, 2011, http://shine.yahoo.com/love-sex/bashing-your-ex-in-
public-may-be-free-speech-but-is-it-in-your-childrens-best-interests-2523754.htmlId. 
65
 Id.  
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rights.
66
   The best interest of the child standard (“the standard”) is used in child custody and 
visitation hearings.
67
 Although there are some state to state variations of the elements that 
comprise the standard, generally it allows family law judges to consider a parent’s ideology 
when making their determination.
68
  First Amendment scholar, Eugene Volokh, has argued that 
“the best interest test lets courts engage in a wide range of [otherwise unconstitutional] 
viewpoint-based speech restrictions.”69  Furthermore, Volokh argues that the First Amendment is 
implicated not only when courts issue orders restricting parents’ speech, but also when courts 
make custody or visitation decisions based on such speech.”70  Unlike the strict scrutiny standard 
that is applied to other content-based restrictions on speech, appellate review of child custody or 
visitation orders that contain restrictions on parents’ speech apply an abuse of discretion 
standard, and are rarely set aside.
71
 
c. Compelled Speech as a Form of Redress 
Under our First Amendment doctrine, speech compulsions and restrictions on speech are 
afforded the same level of protection.
72
  Any government regulation aimed at compelling speech 
is deemed “an infringement on a person’s right not to speak and not to associate, rights the First 
Amendment ensures.”73  The Byron v. Byron case (referenced in Part I. “Introduction” of this 
paper); received wide media attention when an Ohio Magistrate presiding over Domestic 
                                                          
66
 See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 631 (2006).  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 638 (citing Hogue v. Hogue, 147 S.W.3d 245, 254 (2004), reversed a lower court 
decision that ordered parent to conceal homosexual preference from their child). 
70
 Volokh supra note 66 at 631. 
71
 See Volokh supra note 66 at 647. 
72
 See Volokh supra note 66 at 652 (“compelled affirmations, especially affirmations of opinion, 
are indeed treated the same as speech restrictions.”). 
73
  Laurel S. Banks, Schutz v. Schutz, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 105, 117 (1992-1993). 
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Relations Court issued an order that both restricted and compelled a litigant’s speech over social 
media.
74
  
On December 2, 2011 Elizabeth Byron (“Elizabeth”) filed Motion for Contempt against 
her then estranged husband Mark Byron (“Mark”).75  Elizabeth contended that Mark violated a 
prior Civil Order of Protection that prohibited Mark from having any “direct or indirect” contact 
with Elizabeth when he posted the following comments on his Facebook wall:
76
   
Reunited [with son] after four months apart 
 
If you are an evil, vindictive woman who wants to ruin your 
husband’s life and take your son’s father away from him 
completely, all you need to do is say that you’re scared of your 
husband or domestic partner and they’ll take him away. 
 
She filed false DV against me along with a false Civil Protection 
Order
77
 
 
After reviewing the contents of the Facebook posts, Ohio Magistrate, Paul W. Myers, 
found Mark in contempt of the Civil Protection Order.
78
  Specifically, the Magistrate’s found that 
Mark violated the Civil Protection Order by:  
[p]osting only his self-serving belief that the domestic violence 
charge was false and failing to include anything regarding the 
judicial process which led to the issuance of the civil protection 
order [although] clearly not illegal … was just as clearly intended 
to mentally abuse, harass, and annoy [Elizabeth] and to generate a 
negative and venomous response toward her from his Facebook 
friends…79   
 
                                                          
74
 See Byron supra note 1. 
75
 Id.  
76
 Id. 
77
 See Byron supra note 1. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id.; (Some of the comments generated by Mark’s Facebook venting against his wife and legal 
proceedings include: “Fuck that bitch”, “She must be Funky Rotten” and “What an evil bitch!”).  
14 
 
Mark was subsequently sentenced to sixty (60) days in jail and a fine. 
80
 Or, in the alterative, 
Mark was given the option of purging himself of the contempt and avoiding both the sixty (60) 
day jail sentence and fine by posting on his Facebook wall (“every day no later than 9:00 A.M. 
for a period of 30 days commencing February 1, 2013”) an apology to Elizabeth that was 
authored by the Magistrate himself.  The apology included the following statements: 
I would like to apologize to my wife, Elizabeth Byron, for the 
comments regarding her and our son … which were posted on my 
Facebook wall on or about November 23, 2011.  I hereby 
acknowledge that two judicial officials … have heard evidence and 
determined that I committed an act of domestic violence against 
Elizabeth on January 17, 2011.  I hereby apologize to Elizabeth for 
casting her in an unfavorable light by suggesting that she withheld 
[our son] from me or that she in any way prevented me from 
seeing [our son] during that period.  That decision was mine and 
mine alone. I further apologize to all my Facebook Friends for 
attempting to mislead them … which caused several of my 
Facebook Friends to respond with angry, venomous, and 
inflammatory comments of their own. …81 
 
Mark chose to post the apology over serving the sixty day jail sentence and paying a fine.
82
  
Aside from having to post the Facebook apology for thirty (30) consecutive days, Mark was also 
forbidden from eliminating or in any manner reducing the number of his Facebook Friends who 
had access to his Facebook comments.
83
  Mark was further instructed to designate Elizabeth or 
another individual designated by her as his Facebook Friend to monitor compliance with the 
order.
84
   
The Byron case is interesting because it implicated Mark’s First Amendment rights by (1) 
effectuating a content-based restriction on his social media speech and (2) compelling Mark to 
post an apology drafted by a court magistrate that clearly cut against his personally held beliefs 
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on the matter.  By finding Mark in contempt of the Civil Protection Order the court placed a 
content-based restriction on Mark’s speech.  The magistrate found Mark in contempt although he 
arguably took precautions (Elizabeth was blocked from his Facebook wall and his comments 
never addressed her by name) to avoid his wife finding out about his Facebook comments.
85
  
And yet, the Magistrate held that Mark’s comments were “clearly intended to be mentally 
abusive, harassing and annoying to his wife.”86  The Magistrate’s findings raise important 
questions about the scope of Civil Protection Orders and their effect on a litigant’s freedom of 
expression, especially in a case like Byron, where the speech did not directly reference nor 
specifically address the person the Civil Order of Protection sought to protect.  
   Second, the choice the Magistrate gave Mark between serving time in jail for sixty (60) 
days and posting the Facebook for thirty (30) days clearly fell within the parameters of 
compelled speech which the Supreme Court deemed in 1943.
 87
  In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, the court addressed the issue compulsory speech in the context of a 
statewide regulation that required public school children to salute the United States flag while 
reciting the pledge of allegiance.
88
  Ultimately, the Court declared the statewide regulation 
unconstitutional, by eloquently stating that compelled speech, like a flag saluting mandate, 
“transcends constitutional limitations on [the state’s] power… … no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox… or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act...”89  Mark Byron was never really presented with a choice of punishments, the order 
compelled him to publish an apology authored by the Magistrate that clearly contradicted his 
personal opinions on the matter.   
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The cases above show the great level of discretion and deference afforded to the judges 
that preside over family law cases.  However, these cases also highlight some of the dangers 
associated with giving judges unfettered discretion in dealing with social media-related evidence 
and impact these decisions have on litigants’ freedom of speech and expression.  Litigants’ First 
Amendment rights should not have to be sacrificed in the absence of an acceptable a framework 
within which to analyze social media-related evidence.    
 
IV. THE INTERSECTION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN OTHER 
AREAS OF THE LAW 
 
A review of how other areas of the law have addressed the intersection of social media 
and First Amendment rights is presented below.  The areas of education, employment and 
criminal law are analyzed in an attempt to identify the usage or standardization of a basic 
framework for balancing First Amendment rights within the context of social media.  
a. Education law Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights  
In recent years, we have become ever more aware of the negative impact that bullying 
has on students.  The issue has been exacerbated by the fact that bullying has transcended the 
schoolyard and evolved with the increased use of the internet and growth in popularity of social 
media as a communication platform.  Currently, a more sophisticated, and in some ways more 
damaging, form of bullying is occurring via the World Wide Web known as cyberbulling.
90
  
Cyberbulling has been defined as “willful and repeated harm inflicted through the use of 
computers, cell phone and other devices…”91 Since most incidents of cyberbulling take place off 
campus, school administrators and courts have grappled with how to properly deal with this new 
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form of bullying and its damaging effects on students.
92
  At the heart of the problem is the fact 
that, attempts by school administrators to regulate cyberbulling implicates students’ First 
Amendment rights.  Today, schools continue to rely on a few seminal Supreme Court’s decisions 
that have attempted to balance students’ First Amendment rights with the schools duty to 
maintain order and protect students from harm.
93
    
i. Tinker and its Successors 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the Supreme Court’s 
first attempt at addressing the issue of students’ on campus speech.94 Decided in 1969, Tinker set 
a standard for regulating student speech that is still relied upon by courts and school officials 
today.
95
  The Tinker standard provides that “…conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which 
for any reason … materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech.”96  While the Tinker standard empowers school officials to regulate certain types of 
student speech, it clearly stated that the school must be able to show that “its action was caused 
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”97   
                                                          
92
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In his now famous opinion, Justice Fortas stated that neither “students [n]or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”98  The 
Court found that Tinker had engaged in a form of symbolic speech protected by the First 
Amendment.
99
  The Court noted that the school was not able show that the students’ actions 
substantially interfered with the school’s appropriate level of discipline and its ability to maintain 
safety.
100
  Ultimately, the Court found that the school was in violation of the students’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech and expression.
101
 
Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue of student speech on three 
separate occasions.  First, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser.
102
  In Fraser the Court distinguished between the protections that the First Amendment 
grants adults in making “use of an offensive form of expression” and that of public school 
children.
103
  The Court found it a “highly appropriate function of public school education to 
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”104 The Court held that the 
First Amendment did not prevent the school administrators from disciplining students for the use 
of “offensively lewd and indecent speech” in a school event.105    
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Next, in 1988, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
106
  In 
Kuhlmeier, the Court noted that “public schools do not possess all of the attributes of … public 
forums …” and therefore, “…school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech 
of students, teachers, and other members of the school community.”107  Moreover, the Court held 
that public schools can “exercise editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities as long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”.108  
Lastly, in 2007, the Supreme Court decided Morse v. Frederick.
109
  In Morse, the 
Supreme Court held that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student 
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” 
110
  The Court noted that it did not base its decision on the fact that the student speech in this was 
either disruptive (Tinker)
111
 or offensive (Fraser)
112
 but rather focused on the illegal nature of the 
activity the speech promoted and the existing problem of drug among school-aged children.
113
 
1. Applying Tinker to Student Off-Campus Internet Speech 
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The Supreme Court’s decisions addressing student speech have been limited to on-
campus or school sponsored events and activities.
114
    However, in recent years lower courts 
have dealt with the issue of whether schools should regulate student speech that causes 
disruption within the school but occurs off-campus (as part of a non-school sponsored event or 
activity) or on the internet.
115
  District Courts have uniformly applied the Tinker standard to 
examine off-campus internet student speech,
116
 however courts are divided on the issue of 
whether a school must establish a “sufficient nexus”117 between the off-campus internet speech 
before the Tinker standard is applied.
118
  A majority of courts have not required schools to 
establish this sufficient nexus standard.
119
  However, in some courts have imposed a two part test 
for examining student off-campus internet speech.  In these jurisdictions, a school must first 
show a substantial nexus between the student speech and the school.
120
 Next, these courts use the 
Tinker standard to examine the extent that the student speech “materially and substantially 
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interfere[d] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”121  In 
examining this second prong, courts consider the “intensity of on campus discussions 
surrounding the expression, the burden the expression places on the administration, and whether 
the expression contains violent content.”122 
Most recently, the Tinker standard was applied to a cyberbulling case in Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cnty. Sch.
123
 In this case, Kowalski, a high school senior used her home computer to 
create a fake MySpace profile in which she ridiculed a fellow classmate.
124
   After creating the 
fake profile, Kowalski invited one hundred (100) classmates to “friend” the page and join in the 
ridicule of the student.
125
  The targeted student and her parents became aware of the page and 
reported it to school administrators.
126
  Kowalski was subsequently suspended from school.
127
  
Kowalski brought an action against the school.
128
 Among her many claims, Kowalski alleged 
that the school was in violation of her First Amendment rights by punishing her for speech that 
occurred outside the school.
129
  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
school, holding that the school acted within its authority when it punished Kowalski.
130
  On 
Appeal, the court held that the school had not violated Kowalski’s First Amendment rights 
because, (1) there was a nexus between her speech and “the school's pedagogical interests … to 
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justify the action taken by administrators …,131 (2) the speech was materially and substantially 
disruptive in that it interfered with the school's work and collided with the rights of other 
students to be secure and to be let alone,
132
 and (3) it was foreseeable that her conduct would 
reach the school...”133  The Supreme Court has since denied Kowalski a writ of certiorari.134 
b. Employment law: the Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights  
 
In the last five years we have seen an increase in litigations resulting from employers 
terminating employees because of their internet speech.
135
  Some attribute the phenomenon to the 
fact that the average aged Facebook user has transitioned from the school to the work 
environment.
 136
 Some opine that at the heart of the problem lies in the fact that “[w]hile most 
business executives assert they have a right to know about all of their employees’ social 
networking activities, most employees believe their bosses have not right to inquire into their 
non-work lives.” 137  The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of employees’ First Amendment 
rights in the context of retaliation, where an employee suffers adverse employment action for 
criticizing her employer.
138
  However, the Court has not addressed the issue of an Employee’s 
First Amendment rights with respect to off-duty, non-work related speech.
139
  Nonetheless, lower 
courts faced with increased wrongful termination lawsuits resulting from an employee’s use of 
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social media, have had to make decisions based on statues that did not contemplate the social 
media phenomenon when crafted.
140
   
Before addressing First Amendment protections afforded in the employment context, it is 
important to note that the law draws a distinction between private and public employees.
141
 
Private employees are afforded less free speech protection than their public sector 
counterparts.
142
 The majority of private sector employees are considered “at will”.  Under the 
employment-at-will-doctrine and employee can be terminated with or without cause, so long as 
the reason for termination does not contravene public policy or protected under a limited 
category of protected speech.
143
  Therefore, a private sector employer is within his rights to 
terminate an employee for social media posts the employer finds objectionable, even if it is 
completely non-work related. 
Contrastingly, public sector employees have enjoyed more robust free speech protections 
in the workplace than private sector employees; public employers are subject to the restraints of 
the First Amendment.
144
  In 2006 the Supreme Court set out the current test for disputes arising 
out of adverse employment action resulting from an employee’s speech or expression related to 
work.
145
 In Garcetti, the Court set out a three-part test to determine whether an employee’s 
speech should be afforded First Amendment protection and insulated from adverse action. First, 
the court must decide whether the employee was speaking as a private citizen rather than within 
                                                          
140
 See Laura J. Thalacker, & Courtney Miller O'mara, Public Employees and The First 
Amendment: The Intersection of Free Speech Rights and Social Media, 20 Nevada Lawyer 13, 14 (2012). 
141
 See Crane supra note 135 at 642 
142
 Id.  
143
 Active use of social media, is not one of the stated public policies protected under the 
employment-at-will-doctrine. Some of the limited statutory speech protections afforded to private sector 
employees include protections for: whistleblowing, those who testify in judicial or administrative 
proceedings, federal and state antidiscrimination laws (Title VII), concerted activities for the purpose of 
mutual protection even apart from formation of a union, public policy tort, and contract.  
144
 See Crane supra note 135 at 644. 
145
 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
24 
 
his official capacity as a public employee.
146
  Next, the court must determine whether the speech 
was a matter of public concern.
147
 Lastly, if the court determines that the speech was a matter of 
public concern, then the court must determine whether the employer’s interest in maintaining an 
effective workplace outweighs the employee’s free speech rights.148  
In 2010, the National Relations Board (“NLRB”) announced that the National Relations 
Act’s (“NLRA”) coverage expanded to protect employees’ social media speech.149  The NLRA’s 
coverage is expended to most private employees.
150
  However, it is important to note that in the 
2010 expansion of the NLRA coverage,  social media-related speech is limited to protect 
employee concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.
 151
  Therefore, an 
employee who resorts to his Facebook wall to vent about his how much he dislikes his supervisor 
or co-workers is likely not afforded the protection of the NLRA.
 152
  
c. Criminal law: Intersection of Social Media and First Amendment Rights  
There are currently two federal statutes in place to combat what has been classified as 
“cyberstalking” or abuse via social media, the Federal Interstate Stalking Statue, 18 U.S.C. § 
2261A and the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c).
153
  The Federal Interstate 
Stalking Statue, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A was enacted in 1996 as part of the Violence Against Women 
Act (“VAWA”).154  The statute was subsequently amended to cover electronic communications 
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that took place across state lines.
155
  The amendment imposes criminal liability to anyone who 
with intent: 
travels in interstate … or …   uses the mail, any interactive 
computer service, or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce 
to engage in a course of conduct that causes substantial emotional 
distress to that person or places that person in reasonable fear of 
the death of, or serious bodily injury to, any of the persons 
described ….156 
 
In effect, the statue extends to emails, tweets, blogs and other social media posts where the 
stalker can be shown to have the requisite intent and the victim has suffered emotional distress or 
fear as a result.
157
  However, the statute is limited in that it is only applicable when the 
cyberstalker and the victim live in different states.  Furthermore, the Federal Interstate Stalking 
Statute does not protect against incidents of anonymous cyberstalking.
158
 
A second federal statute offering some protection to victims of harassment/cyberstalking 
is the Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c).
159
  Under the Interstate 
Communications Act: 
Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any 
communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any 
threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
160
    
 
Unlike the Interstate Stalking Statute, the Interstate Communications Act attaches to all 
forms of online communications, whether anonymous or not.
161
  Nonetheless, this statute 
requires that the online behavior rise to the level of “threat of injury.”162  Therefore, online 
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harassing behavior such as repeated messages containing graphic sexually implicit messages, 
posting embarrassing photos over social media, or negative commentary of a person are not 
covered by this statute.
163
  The statute is limited to “true threats,”164 one of the few categories of 
speech that fall outside First Amendment Protection.   
          After a close review of the three areas of the law (education, employment and criminal) 
mentioned above it is evident that there is some great variation among the tests applied in 
evaluating evidence of social media however, there were two common trends.  Specifically, all 
three areas considered whether there was a nexus between the social media speech and the 
impacted party. And, all three considered the impact the litigants’ social media speech had on the 
opposing party and provide a threshold standard the speech must meet before adverse 
consequences can apply.   
 
V. TOWARDS A WORKING PARADIGM FOR ASSESSING THE PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES TO LITIGANTS’ USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
Our judicial system has been caught off guard by the social media phenomenon.  Courts 
have struggled to find a balance between the robust free speech values afforded by the First 
Amendment and the need to regulate online speech.  The impact of social media has been 
especially hard felt by litigants in family law disputes where First Amendment rights have been 
sacrificed in the name of judicial discretion.   
It is important to acknowledge that family law judges have valid interest in maintaining 
order and protecting the rights of all the litigants that come before them.  Additionally, because 
of the diverse needs of families and individuals in family court is anything but predictable, it is 
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important that any proposed framework for analyzing a litigant’s social media speech have some 
built-in level of flexibility to allow judges to adapt the ever changing circumstances they are 
confronted with.  Lastly, an effective framework for analyzing a litigant’s social media speech is 
one that attempts to balance First Amendment rights and the court’s interest in maintaining legal 
order.  A proposed test for family law judges analyzing a litigant’s social media speech would 
require the judge to consider the following: 
1. A nexus exist between the speech and the judicial proceeding 
2. The speech has to be substantially disruptive to the effective resolution of the 
contested matter or 
o The standard would require a more than a statement of dissent against your 
former spouse but less than a threat of physical harm.  
3. The speech violates either some aspect of a standing order or undermines the court’s 
authority.   
o This prong would address violations of standing orders of protection 
4. Was the litigant’s speech accessible to the opposing party 
o This prong would require the court to look into the litigant’s social media 
privacy settings.  The fact that the litigant intentionally restricted access to his 
social media accounts specifically restricted the opposing party’s ability to 
view his speech should be weighed in favor of the litigant.  After all, the 
Supreme Court has noted that “the burden normally falls upon the viewer to 
"avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] 
eyes."
165
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This framework would also limit the litigant’s liability for third party comments generated by his 
posts.  And lastly, if the litigants’ speech meet the standards above and the court chooses to 
enforce a content-based restriction on the litigant, such restriction on speech should be limited to 
the completion of the judicial proceeding or standing order in cases where there is an active 
restraining order.   
Furthermore, there are other options family law judges can explore in lieu of ordering 
content based restrictions.  Judges can order litigants to discontinue visiting each other’s social 
media pages.  Judges can also order litigants’ to attend classes that focus on the implication 
social media has on an individual’s privacy and detail the risks involved with using social media.   
Lastly, social media providers should be held to some level of accountability when they 
fail to act in instances where the speech posted on their platforms rises to the level of severe 
harassment or threat.  Specifically, social media providers should be liable for their failure to 
remove posts that within one of the categories of unprotected speech and have been appropriately 
flagged or reported for removal. 
 
